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Abstract
Over the past decades, ‘governing by numbers’ has taken a flight in the higher education sector. Performance-based bud-
geting and quality assurance schemes orient universities to new objectives, while rankings have globalised the metrified
observation of higher education at large. Where previously no indicators existed, they are being introduced; where indi-
cators already existed, they are being standardised for purposes of comparison. This thematic issue aims to work towards
a more comprehensive understanding of the growing diversity of quantification-based instruments in higher education
sectors in three European countries. The effects of quantification are noticed at all levels of the higher education system,
from policy makers at the top of the regulatory pyramid down to students and academic staff. Yet even quantifiers outside
of the regulatory system, such as ranking and metrics organisations, may have an important bearing on the operation of
the university organisation and the sector at large. Thus, an entire governance landscape emerges in which actors at var-
ious levels turn to numbers for guidance. The articles in this thematic issue analyse the life cycle of such numbers, from
their origins, through to their production and finally, their consequences. This editorial outlines the central questions and
overarching issues addressed by the thematic issue and introduces its various contributions.
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1. Public Sector Quantification in the Limelight
Twenty-five years after Porter (1995) focussed atten-
tion on the centrality of numbers in the conduct of
modern social and political life, the place of quantifica-
tion in the limelight of the social sciences appears undi-
minished. Indeed, as overview articles by Espeland and
Stevens (2009) or Popp Berman and Hirschman (2018)
have shown, over time, quantification research has in-
creasingly branched out, become institutionalised, and
settled on a division of labour.
One of the critical assumptions of quantification stud-
ies or ‘governance by numbers’ is the idea that numbers
transform organisational and political behaviour. Two
powerful time diagnoses by Power (1997) and, more re-
cently, Dahler-Larsen (2012) have argued that late mod-
ern society is characterised by relentless efforts at au-
dit and evaluation. This trend, in a memorable phrase by
Miller (2001, pp. 381–282), has generated an “avalanche
of numbers” for decisionmaking in “almost any organiza-
tion.” This has had remarkable effects. As early as 1999,
Hood, Scott, James, Jones and Travers, in a landmark
study, estimated that policies for control inside govern-
ment cost £1 billion per year in the UK alone (Hood et al.,
1999, p. 42). Since then, the scale of quality-controlling,
competition-inducing, and waste-watching in the pub-
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lic sector seems only to have grown, although accents
may have changed and intensities differ across countries
(Hood, 2007; Hood, James, Peters, & Scott, 2004). Thus,
the promise of governance by numbers not only comes
with a price tag, but also alters routines and certainties;
and that requires academic scrutiny.
It is in this context that this thematic issue turns its
attention to the advent of quantification in the higher ed-
ucation sector where ‘governing by numbers’ appears to
have taken a flight. Performance-based budgeting and
quality assurance schemes orients universities to new
objectives (Ferlie, Musselin, & Andresani, 2008; Huber
& Hillebrandt, 2019), while rankings have globalised
the metrified observation of higher education at large
(Espeland & Sauder, 2007, 2016). Where previously no
indicators existed, they are being introduced; where in-
dicators already existed, they are being standardised for
purposes of comparison. The proliferation and diversifi-
cation of quantification has already been diagnosed; the
next step is to analyse its manifestations and effects in
the fields it is applied to.
2. Puzzles Addressed in This Thematic Issue
This thematic issue is the result of a workshop on quan-
tification in higher education that was held at Bielefeld
University in March 2019. Together, the articles present
empirical research from three western European coun-
tries (England, Germany, the Netherlands), covering var-
ious manifestations of quantification, including rankings,
finance models, quality assurance, and performance an-
alytics. In spite of their thematic and conceptual diver-
sity, the various contributions are united by a number
of common concerns and recurrent themes at the core
of quantification studies. We would here like to highlight
two of them.
First, the contributions provide further insight into
what could be labelled ‘the life cycle of quantification’,
i.e., covering instruments from their origins, through
to their production, and finally, their consequences.
Starting off from a perceived weaving fault in the ex-
isting system, policy makers typically develop rudimen-
tary systems of indicators and targets in order to clarify
lines of accountability, increase efficiency, or enhance
the innovative potential of universities. Problems of-
ten emerge when quantification instruments run into
the complexities of a differentiated regulatory field. In
higher education, this encompasses the multiple tasks
(teaching/research) and foci (fundamental/applied re-
search, different disciplines) of universities, as well as
the differential systems within which they and their staff
operate (tenured/non-tenured positions, national edu-
cational systems). This typically casts different groups
within the system against each other. Depending on the
situation at hand, this may be universities against min-
istries, professors against junior academics, or resource-
intensive against student-intensive disciplines. The con-
sequences of these quantification-induced conflicts de-
pend on the question how much ‘damage’ a system is
willing to accept. Here, there appear to be marked differ-
ences depending on national legacies, with the German
and Dutch system more careful and the English system
more far-reaching.
A second theme of the articles concerns the ‘regula-
tory nexus in higher education.’ Regulators at ministries
and university administrations, confronted with political
and societal pressures as well as international norms and
standards, are thought to fall back on quantification in
order to raise their profile in the competition for scarce
resources, be it money, students, or prestige. In this ac-
count, faculties and academic staff are the largely pas-
sive but resisting recipients of their administration’s and
external regulators’ steering strategies (Schimank, 2005;
Strathern, 2000). The contributions in this thematic issue
question the schematic nature of this account, sketching
a more dynamic picture of interactions between policy
makers and professionals. The former are often recruited
from the latter and show a reluctance to implement
too far-reaching quantification instruments, while pro-
fessionals themselves often complain about inefficiency
and a lack of tangible recognition of their achievements.
Moreover, several contributions raise attention to the
pivotal role of newly emerging economic actors outside
of the regulatory system, such as ranking and metrics
organisations. The new calculative infrastructures that
these actors create are critical in the understanding both
of the diffusion of numbers as well as specific constraints
to governance.
3. The Articles in This Thematic Issue
The contributions to the thematic issue are clustered
around these two themes. The articles by Kandiko
Howson and Buckley (2020), Dix, Kaltenbrunner, Tijdink,
Valkenburg, and de Rijcke (2020), and Huber (2020) take
up aspects of the life cycle theme and offer case studies
of quantification in each of the three countries illustrat-
ing how governance by numbers is designed, and how
the various actors respond to signals of dysfunctionality
that emerge over time. The regulatory nexus theme in-
cludes articles by Ringel, Brankovic, and Werron (2020),
Hillebrandt (2020), and Krüger (2020). These authors ad-
dress the emergence and usage of newnumerical data in-
frastructures, paying special attention to the administra-
tive and organisational capacities that these infrastruc-
tures enable, but also require.
Kandiko Howson and Buckley (2020) describe the ca-
reer of quantification as a way to measure learning gain
in UK undergraduate education. From the 1990s onward,
attempts by government regulators to create a mar-
ket for higher education required an informational level
playing field, which quantification was meant to deliver.
Since tuition fees nearly trebled to £9,000 per annum
in 2012, the drive to give students demonstrable ‘value
for money’ increased. Such value, the authors point out,
is routinely defined in terms of “‘corporate culture’ [for
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universities] and individual monetary gain [for students]”
(Kandiko Howson & Buckley, 2020, p. 7). In this context,
measuring learning quality logically makes up the latest
incarnation of this marketisation agenda. The authors of-
fer a detailed account of the vast efforts and material re-
sources that the UK regulator has expended on translat-
ing this ideal into reality. Several parties were included in
pilot projects for the development of suitable indicators.
The efforts began to be resisted when affected actors no-
ticed that indicators were borrowed from the rather dis-
similar US context, and were going to be applied with lit-
tle heed to disciplinary and other variations within uni-
versities. As specific policies faltered, the data remained
in place. In the end, a situation emerges of numbers in
search of a purpose. Or, in the authors’ words, “without
a rationale for developing, selecting and using measures
the number…becomes an end in itself” (Kandiko Howson
& Buckley, 2020, p. 11).
The contribution of Dix et al. (2020) focusses on the
Dutch context. Their case consists of research depart-
ments within a medical centre which are confronted
with a new performance measurement instrument that
directly affects their funding situation. Like Kandiko
Howson and Buckley (2020), the case emerges against
a backdrop of marketisation. However, the author’s ap-
proach to the concept of ‘value’ is rather different.
Borrowing from the notion of ‘economies of worth’
coined by Boltanski and Thévenot, the authors analyse
a controversy over quantification with quite real con-
sequences: The question whether a ‘market language’
of value should determine the allocation of scarce re-
sources. The analysis lays bare the ‘epistemic language’
by which opponents of market-based competition criti-
cise the quantification instrument in place. The strength
of this article lies in its detailed analysis of sixteen in-
terviews conducted with actors across the organisation,
which allows for a nuanced account. While quantifica-
tion is proposed as a way of trading arbitrary finance in-
equalities for a more transparent system, management
also proves to be sensitive to some of the discontents
voiced by opponents of marketisation. For example, it
is unwilling to put the long-term financial viability of de-
partments at risk. The article thus shows that arguments
for and against quantification-based marketisation can
get blended. In the authors’ words, “we should be care-
ful in depicting higher education as populated by ‘mar-
ket universities’ fully enmeshed in ‘epistemic capitalism”’
(Dix et al., 2020, pp. 23–24).
The article by Huber (2020) complements the previ-
ous two contributions by addressing the role of financial
quantification in a German university. University man-
agement is represented as a team charged with bridging
the expectations gap between state regulators and aca-
demics. The role of quantification in this balancing act is
inherently fragmented and uneven: Rather than steering
the university systematically towards a unified goal, var-
ious types of numbers introduced at different moments
in time address a multiplicity of audiences within the
university organisations. This is not accidental. Rather,
multiple policies are in place to remedy the perverse ef-
fects of other policies, leading to a conceptual represen-
tation of university quantification as foremost an organic,
layered whole. Here, the author refers to the organisa-
tional sociology of Luhmann: “reforms do not form part
of a grand plan, but recurrently intervene to repair the
shortcomings and unintended effects of previous inter-
ventions” (Huber, 2020, p. 26). The dynamic and multi-
centred model of quantification allows for a number of
interesting conclusions. It appears clear that reality of
quantification in practice is inherently a ‘messy affair’
without one single premeditated logic. Yet, at the end
of the day, the layering of quantification succeeds, how-
ever transiently, in creating a certain stability of purpose:
management by numbers “can to a large extent be in-
corporated into the traditional organisational formof the
university” (Huber, 2020, p. 34).
The contribution by Ringel et al. (2020) shifts the fo-
cus in several respects. Rather than the effects of quan-
tification, it considers its preconditions. The selected
case, that of higher education rankings, constitutes a
form of quantification that has over the past decades
increasingly ‘gone global’ (see also Brankovic, Ringel, &
Werron, 2018). The authors bring attention to an as-
pect that has hitherto received scarce attention in this
lively research field: The material preconditions for the
creation and sustenance of rankings. A key reason for
the ‘rankings boom’ in higher education and other areas,
the authors argue, lies in the organisational turn. They
demonstrate how organisations offer capacities for the
creation and dissemination of ranking that vastly exceed
those of individuals. As a result, ranking organisations are
able to publish increasingly sophisticated rankings with a
regular frequency, while offering the ‘maintenancework’
required to bind them to ever-more diverse audiences
of ‘consumers.’ Thus, as the authors point out, “the or-
ganizational production of rankings provides an elemen-
tary and hitherto overlooked infrastructure” accounting
for their success and pervasiveness (Ringel et al., 2020,
p. 44). The article’s focus offers an interesting additional
perspective by ‘turning the camera’ on a group of actors
that fall outside of the regulatory context proper, but
which nevertheless have gathered considerable clout in
parts of the higher education sector, in a trend that has si-
multaneously emerged in other competitive sectors such
as hospitality, catering, and health care.
In his article, Hillebrandt (2020) observes that al-
though gathering quantified data is a growing business
everywhere, in Germany actual reliance on this data is
limited. What explains the limited effect of regulatory
control through numbers in Germany? With the catchy
metaphor of the Mercedes that is left in the garage, the
author explores three hypotheses: First, a legal hypothe-
sis that suggests quantification being curbed by legal pro-
tections of higher education providers: The state wants
‘to drive the Mercedes,’ but legal protections wreck this
strategy. The state gives up on steering through numbers
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while it continues to collect data. A second, labelled dys-
functionality hypothesis holds that regulators see quan-
tification as a flawed and impracticable pursuit. The
Mercedes may be shiny, but cannot be driven safely. The
flaws and inaccuracies of steering by numbers are consid-
ered too momentous to risk failure. The third hypothe-
sis reflects the federal structure of Germany and suggests
that federal comparison exposes differences and thus po-
tential weaknesses of the responsible Länder (German
states): as such, the Mercedes better stays in the garage.
The article finds that all three hypotheses contribute to an
explanation of the German higher education sector’s en-
gagement with quantification, but it also shows that the
Mercedes is driven sub rosa, meaning that any governing
by numbers “functions in a largely tempered, hybrid, and
untransparent manner” (Hillebrandt, 2020, p. 55).
The article by Krüger (2020) forms a suitable conclud-
ing note to the empirical section of this thematic issue. In
her contribution, Krüger (2020) goes in search of ‘quan-
tification 2.0’ in the amalgam of commercially exploited
data infrastructures that have begun to emerge out of in-
creasingly vast bibliometric data sets. Beyond marketisa-
tion andmanagerialism, she argues, students of quantifi-
cation in the higher education sector should not overlook
ongoing technological development as a push factor in its
own right. As the author states, “bibliometric data has
turned into a self-serving end while their providers are
constantly seeking for new tools to make use of them”
(Krüger, 2020, p. 59). Organisations in the higher edu-
cation sector and beyond have begun to collect data
without any specific purpose, under the (ideologically in-
formed) supposition that eventually uses will be found
for it that will improve organizational performance. New
functionalities invite academics, managers, and regula-
tors to engage with—and even create—data in novel
ways, thereby fomenting alternative ways of regarding
academic work in relation to the individual and (a rein-
vented notion of) the wider profession. Does all of this
spell a dystopian future in which untransparent private
firms remake the academic profession in their commer-
cial image? The author remains cautious here, by point-
ing out that in spite of its performativities, the various
new potential uses of ‘quantification 2.0’ are bounded by
notions of customer (academic community) acceptance
among developers.
Finally, a commentary by Hamann (2020) reflects on
the findings in the articles that form part of this the-
matic issue, focussing in particular on the sociological im-
plications of higher education governance by numbers.
Setting out from the Foucauldian dyad of power and dis-
cipline, he places the phenomenon of academic quan-
tification primarily in the light of what he describes as
‘panopticism’: The creation of new avenues for number-
based mutual observation that rearrange interactions
and create new forms of control. ‘Numerocratic panopti-
cism’ however reveals certain dynamics that depart from
the classic panoptic gaze: it increases the number of ob-
servers, is freed from spatial constraints, and its norma-
tive programme is more open-ended. This, the author
argues, demonstrates that “governance by numbers is
not only an epitome of classical panopticism but…also a
panopticon reversed” (Hamann, 2020, p. 70).
All in all, the various contributions offer a glimpse
onto a wider higher education governance landscape ori-
ented on numbers for guidance. In doing so, they show
a considerable attention to the details and intricacies of
specific policy instruments, and the way in which they
come about. As it turns out, such attention to detail often
pays off as it highlights where problems occur and thus,
how the fault lines of policy conflict are likely to play out.
It becomes clear from the various empirical studies that
in most instances of quantification, such problems do
emerge. Typically, quantification-based steering instru-
ments require fundamental reform within a few years
after their introduction. We attribute this general obser-
vation to the short-term focus of many indicators, which
means that their dysfunctionalities take some time to be-
come apparent. Yet, the contributions to this thematic
issue inevitably lead to the conclusion that, even when
repeatedly bruised and floored, the appeal of higher ed-
ucation quantification continues undiminished.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the participants to
the workshop “Quantifying Higher Education: Origins,
Production, Consequences,” that was held at Bielefeld
University on 28–29 March 2019. The authors fur-
ther gratefully acknowledge funding received from
the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) (Project
No. 627097) under the Open Research Area Scheme
(Project Title: QUAD—Quantification, Administrative
Capacity and Democracy, 2016–2019).
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
References
Brankovic, J., Ringel, L., & Werron, T. (2018). How
rankings produce competition: The case of global
university rankings. Zeitschrift Für Soziologie, 47(4),
270–288.
Dahler-Larsen, P. (2012). The evaluation society. Red-
wood City, CA: Stanford University Press.
Dix, G., Kaltenbrunner, W., Tijdink, J., Valkenburg, G., &
de Rijcke, S. (2020). Algorithmic allocation: Untan-
gling rival considerations of fairness in research man-
agement. Politics and Governance, 8(2), 15–25.
Espeland, W. N., & Sauder, M. (2007). Rankings and re-
activity: How public measures recreate social worlds.
American Journal of Sociology, 113(1), 1–40.
Espeland, W. N., & Sauder, M. (2016). Engines of anxi-
ety: Academic rankings, reputation, and accountabil-
ity. New York, NY: Sage.
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 1–5 4
Espeland, W. N., & Stevens, M. L. (2009). A sociology of
quantification. European Journal of Sociology, 49(3),
401–436.
Ferlie, E., Musselin, C., & Andresani, G. (2008). The steer-
ing of higher education systems: A public manage-
ment perspective. Higher Education, 56, 325–348.
Hamann, J. (2020). Governance by numbers: A panopti-
con reversed? Politics and Governance, 8(2), 68–71.
Hillebrandt, M. (2020). Keeping one’s shiny Mercedes
in the garage: Why higher education quantification
never really took off in Germany. Politics and Gover-
nance, 8(2), 48–57.
Hood, C. (2007). Public servicemanagement by numbers:
Why does it vary?Where has it come from?What are
the gaps and the puzzles? PublicMoney andManage-
ment, 27, 95–102.
Hood, C., James, O., Peters, B. G., & Scott, C. (Eds.).
(2004). Controlling modern government: Variety,
commonality and change. Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar.
Hood, C., Scott, C., James, O., Jones, G., & Travers,
T. (1999). Regulation inside government: Waste-
watchers, quality police and sleaze-busters. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Huber, M. (2020). Steered by numbers: How quantifica-
tion differentiates the reform of a German university.
Politics and Governance, 8(2), 26–35.
Huber, M., & Hillebrandt, M. (2019). “Pay for promise” in
higher education: The influence of NPM on resource
allocation in German universities.Historical Social Re-
search, 44(2), 247–269.
Kandiko Howson, C., & Buckley, A. (2020). Quantifying
learning: Measuring student outcomes in higher ed-
ucation in England. Politics and Governance, 8(2),
6–14.
Krüger, A. K. (2020). Quantification 2.0? Bibliometric
infrastructures in academic evaluation. Politics and
Governance, 8(2), 58–67.
Miller, P. (2001). Governing by numbers: Why calculative
practices matter. Social Research, 68(2), 379–396.
Popp Berman, E., & Hirschman, D. (2018). The sociology
of quantification: Where are we now? Comparative
Sociology, 47(3), 257–266.
Porter, T. (1995). Trust in numbers: The pursuit of objec-
tivity in science and public life. Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press.
Power, M. (1997). The audit society. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Ringel, L., Brankovic, J., & Werron, T. (2020). The orga-
nizational engine of rankings: Connecting “new” and
“old” institutionalism. Politics and Governance, 8(2),
36–47.
Schimank, U. (2005). New public management and the
academic profession: Reflections on the German sit-
uation.Minerva, 43, 361–376.
Strathern, M. (Ed.). (2000). Audit cultures: Anthropologi-
cal studies in accountability, ethics and the academy.
London: Routledge.
About the Authors
Maarten Hillebrandt is Postdoctoral Researcher at the Erik Castrén Institute, University of Helsinki,
where he is involved in a research project on the transparency of EU decision making. Previ-
ously, he participated in the international comparative ORA-funded research project ‘Quantification,
Administrative Capacity and Democracy’ (2016–2019), in which researchers from the London School
of Economics, Paris MinesTech, Bielefeld University, Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg, and Leiden
University were co-collaborators. Maarten specialises in EU institutional law and politics, government
transparency policy, and quantification.
Michael Huber is Professor of Sociology at the Department of Sociology at Bielefeld University. His re-
search is focused on organisational sociology, higher education studies, and regulatory policymaking,
more specifically, risk-based regulation.
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 1–5 5
